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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
to the limitation, however, that it may not be arbitrary, unreasonable,
or capricious. 24 In this case its power has clearly been transcended.
R. B. G.
S. C. S.
LABOR UNIONS-COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT-IN-
JUNCTION-SECTION 876-A C. P. A.-The plaintiff-employer and
defendant-union entered into a collective bargaining agreement for
one year, under the terms of which it was agreed that during its
existence "there should be no strike or lockout." The union called
a strike in alleged violation of the. agreement. The employer then
brought suit for an injunction, alleging a breach of the contract; he
also alleged facts sufficient to state a cause of action under Section
876-a of the New York Civil Practice Act.1 The Appellate Division
dismissed the complaint, reversing the decision of the Special Term
which granted the injunction, on the ground that the contract was
unenforceable in equity as it was against the legislative policy of this
state.2 On appeal, held, reversed, "The complaint contains all the
allegations required by Section 876-a of the Civil Practice Act pre-
Instant case. § 10 of the ACT, 49 STAT. 453, 29 U. S. C. A. § 160
(Supp. 1935).
1 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT §876-a: "Injunctions issued in labor disputes.
1. No court nor any judge * * * shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or a temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing
out of a labor dispute, as hereinafter defined, except after a hearing, and except
after findings of all the folldwing facts by the court * * * : (a) That unlawful
acts have, or a breach of any contract [collective bargaining] not contrary to
public policy, has been threatened or committed and that such acts or breach
will be executed or continued unless restrained; (b) That substantial and
irreparable injury to complainant's property will follow unless the relief
requested is granted; (c) * * * [that compainants will suffer more than the
defendant by denial of the injunctionj ; (d) That complainant has no adequate
remedy at law; (e) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect
complainant's property have failed or are unable to furnish adequate protec-
tion; * * *." (Italics ours.)
Aberdeen Restaurant Corp., 158 Misc. 785, 285 N. Y. Supp. 832 (1935)
(holding that "this section is constitutional since there is no deprivation of a
right, but only a limitation of circumstance under which an injunction will be
issued").
For a discussion of the court's construction of the term "labor dispute" as
used in this section see (1938) 12 ST. JOHN'S L. Rxv. 358.
For a general discussion of the Norris-La Guardia Act upon which § 876-a
is based, see (1938) 13 ST. JoHIN's L. Rav. 171; Tapley, The Anti-Union Con-
tracts (1936) 11 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 40; for discussion of § 876-a see PRAsH-
KER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON NEW YORE PLEADING AND PRACTICE (2d ed.
1937) 1062-64.
Nevins, Inc. v. Kasmach, 252 App. Div. 890 (2d Dept. 1937).
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requisite to the granting of equitable relief." 3 Nevins, Inc. v. Kasmach,
279 N. Y. 323, 18 N. E. (2d) 294 (1938).
Although the legal status of collective bargaining agreements has
been in doubt since their inception, the tendency in recent years has
been to enforce specifically these contracts as between the labor union
and the employer.4  However, courts of equity will not grant a de-
cree which will have the effect of forcing work upon an employee.5
And the New York courts have specifically enforced, by injunctive
relief, contracts entered into between labor unions and the employers
settling their disputes and prohibiting strikes or lockouts during the
term of the said contract. 6 The courts have in the same suit allowed
incidental damages to the union or the employer. 7  In 1935 the New
York Legislature passed Section 87 6-a of the New York Civil Practice
Act declaring that injunctive relief in a "labor dispute" will be grant-
ed only when all of the requirements of that section are met.8 From
'Instant case at 325, 18 N. E .(2d) at 295. It should be noted that on the
first appeal, Nevins, Inc. v. Kasmach, 278 N. Y. 705, 16 N. E. (2d) 852 (1938),
the court denied the. motion to dismiss on the ground that the same did not
merely involve academic and moot questions.
'"Trade agreements are compacts as to wages, hours, recognition of the
union, and general conditions of employment which are made between an em-
ployer or an associatiori of employers and organized labor." PATTERSON, SOciAL
ASPECT OF INDUSTRY (1935) 431, cited in Tanque III, Developnment of Indus-
trial Conciliation and Arbitration Under Trade Agreements (1938) 17 OaX.
L. Rnv. 263; Rice, Collective Labor Agreements in American. Law (1931) 44
HARV. L. REV. 572; Cole, The Civil Suability at Law, of Labor Unions (1939)
8 FORDHAm L. REv. 29; Tapley, loc. 'cit. supra note 1; Comment (1932) 41 YALE
L. J. 1221.
:WALSH, EQuITY (1930) § 66.
"Jacobs v. Cohen, 183 N. Y. 207, 210, 76 N. E. 5, 7 (1905) (holding that
"a contract made by an employer of labor, by which he binds himself to employ
and retain in his employ only members in good standing of a single labor
union, [isJ consonant with public policy, and enforceable in the courts of justice
in this state") ; Schlesinger v. Quinto, 201 App. Div. 487, 194 N. Y. Supp. 401(1st Dept. 1921) ; Goldman v. Cohen, 222 App. Div. 631, 227 N. Y. Supp. 311
(1st Dept. 1928) ; Segenfield v. Friedman, 117 Misc. 731, 193 N. Y. Supp. 128
(1922) (holding that a labor union is a legal entity and suable under the New
York General Association Law)'; Ribner v. Rasco Butter & Egg Co., 135 Misc.
616, 619, 238 N. Y. Supp. 132, 138 (1929) (holding that there is "mutuality of
obligation and mutuality of remedy"); Sullen v. Unity Button Works, Inc.,
144 Misc. 784, 258 N. Y. Supp. 622 (1935); DeAgostina v. Parkshire Ridge
Amusements, 155 Misc. 518, 520, 278 N. Y. Supp. 622, 624 (1935) (holding that
"Closed shop agreements do not contravene public policy and are specifically
enforceable in equity"). But cf. In re Buffalo, 250 N. Y. 275, 165 N. E. 291
(1929) ; see Exchange Bakery v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 530 (1927);
(1938) 13 ST. JOHN'S L. Rav. 166.
For the attitude of the courts prior to Schlesinger v. Quinto, supra, see
Stone Cleaning v. Russell, 38 Misc. 513, 74 N. Y. Supp. 1049 (1902) (holding
that no injunction will issue); to the same effect see Barzlay v. Loewenthal,
134 App. Div. 502, 119 N. Y. Supp. 612 (1st Dept. 1909).
7Ibid.; DeAgostina v. Parkshire Ridge Amusements, 155 Misc. 518, 278
N. Y. Supp. 622 (1935) (holding that a union may recover as part of its
damages loss of wages to its employees, its members, who were forced to go
on strike).
'See note 1, supra.
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a close consideration of the prerequisites required by the Legislature
it appears that no injunction will issue unless the striking and/or
picketing is unlawful.9 Consequently, the Appellate Division, appar-
ently construing the contract in the instant case as preventing all
strikes, held it void as against the public policy of this state as ex-
pressed in Section 876-a.10 It appears that the ratio decidendi of the
Appellate Division was that a contract not to strike was unenforceable
in a court of equity." The contract referred to in subdivision "a"
of Section 876-a is by the terms of the statute one not contrary to
public policy. And, inasmuch as the right to strike cannot be waived
by the parties, the holding appears to be correct.' 2  If it be true that
the "strike clause" in the agreement is unenforceable and keeping in
mind that such provision is a substantial part of the consideration
promised by the union, it is difficult to see how an agreement, wherein
such a clause appears, will be enforced.13 The argument is made that
876-a makes such a clause void (unenforceable), but it is submitted
that 876-a merely regulates procedure and was not intended to affect
the substantive rights of the parties. The question then arises, of what
value is such a contract? Surely, the giving up of a right to strike
for a definite period as consideration for which the employer agrees
to recognize the union, pay higher wages, etc., is not against public
policy.1 4 It is further submitted that the breach of a collective bar-
gaining agreement, which in no way contravenes the statute satisfies
one of the prerequisites for the issuance of an injunction, to wit, sub-
division "a" of 876-a of the Civil Practice Act.15
A further question remains: Will an action lie at law for a
'Ibid.; also consider N. Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT § 876-a, subd. 1 (f).
10 Nevins, Inc. v. Kasmach, 252 App. Div. 890 (2d Dept. 1937) ; see notes 1,
supra, and 12, infra.
Ibid.
"Ibid.; the Special Term stated that an injunction would issue "as an
ordinary action in equity for a breach of the collective bargaining contract
between the plaintiff [employer] and defendant [union] because there was at
the time of the calling of the said strike, no 'labor dispute' [as defined in sub-
division 10(c) of Section 876-a of Civil Practice Act] existing between the
plaintiff and defendant and there is none up to the time of this decision."
It would seem from an examination of subdivision 10(c) that the term
"labor dispute" as used in this statute is sufficiently broad to cover all breaches
of collective bargaining agreements. Further, assuming such a breach is a
"labor dispute" it would appear from a reading of Section 876-a, subdivision 1,
that a compliance with all the requirements of this section are necessary to
bring the case within the .purview of the statute. See note 1, supra.
"Congress * * * recognized the right to strike-that the employees could
lawfully cease work at their own volition because of the failure of the employer
to meet their demands." National Labor Relations Board v. Fansteel Metallurgi-
cal Corp., 59 Sup. Ct. 490 (1939) ; see (1939) 13 ST. JOHN'S L. Rzv. 395.
WHITNEY, CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1934) §§ 93, 94.
" See notes 4 and 6, supra.
'See note 1, mipra. "As the law stands it is still possible to obtain an
injunction after a hearing when violence, fraud, and breach of lawful contract




breach of a collective bargaining agreement? To date there have been
no adjudications on this point.16 This anomalous situation may be
explained, undoubtedly, in that equity offers the more adequate re-
lief.l7 In the case of Gull v. Barton, the court by way of dictum said:
"The agreement [collective bargaining] referred to was a valid con-
tract, which may be enforced in any proper manner." 18
The decision of the Court of Appeals in the instant case, unfor-
tunately, did not pass upon the validity of such an agreement, i.e., a
collective bargaining agreement containing a "strike clause". 19 By
holding that the complaint stated a good cause of action, it might be
inferred that the contract was not contrary to public policy and, there-
fore, the breach thereof would satisfy subdivision "a" of Section 876-a
of the Civil Practice Act.
B. B.
LIBEL-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-EFFEcT OF "REPUBLICA-
TION".-Plaintiff alleged that he was libeled by defendant in its pub-
lication of December 16, 1935. It was further alleged that defendant
"republished" the libel in March, 1937 by allowing a third party to
read copies of the newspaper kept on file in its offices. The present
action was commenced on May 7, 1937, more than one year after
the first publication but within the statutory period after the alleged
"republication". Held, two judges dissenting, action barred by Stat-
" Rice, op. cit. supra note 4, at 604.
'x See note 6, supra; see also Comment (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 1221.
"a 164 App. Div. 293, 295, 149 N. Y. Supp. 952, 953 (3d Dept. 1914);
Keysaw v. Dotterweich, 121 App. Div. 58, 59, 105 N. Y. Supp. 562 (4th Dept.
1907) ; Stone Cleaning v. Russell, 38 Misc. 513, 515, 516, 77 N. Y. Supp. 1049,
1050 (1902), holding that the "plaintiff, if it has any cause of action, will have
an adequate remedy at law, just as would any other employee wrongfully dis-
charged. It will be possible for it [the union] to show the amount of services
of the time specified in the contract rendered to the defendant by others than
its members, and which its members might have rendered, and the consequent
damages, if any." (Italics ours.)
This case also determines the rights of the individual employees, who are
union members by virtue of a collective bargainiig agreement. Such employees
will be permitted to sue in' their own names under the beneficiary contract
theory, thereby repudiating the "agency" and "usage" theories. But cf. Lang-
made v. Olean Brewing Co., 137 App. Div. 355, 121 N. Y. Supp. 388 (4th Dept.
1910), which accepted the "usage" theory by way of dicta. For a very able
study of this problem see Rice, loc. cit. supra note 4; see O'Keefe v. United
Ass'n of Plumbers, 277 N. Y. 300, 14 N. E. (2d) 77 (1937). See WEITNEY,
op. cit. supra note 13, at 118 et seq. for discussion of beneficiary contracts.
Jacobs v. Cohen, 183 N. Y. 207, 76 N. E. 5 (1905), holding that an action
will lie against an employer by a union on a note given as security "to be
applied as liquidated damages", if the collective bargaining agreement is violated
by the employer.
Instant case at 325, 18 N. E. (2d) at 295.
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